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NOTE
DNA DATABASE STATUTES &
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE
Warren R. Webster, Jr.t
I. INTRODUCTION
The human body is the best picture of the human soul.1
ALTHOUGH WRITTEN WELL BEFORE the advent of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) technology, these words seem
increasingly to reflect reality with each passing day. The con-
cept of genetic identity presents new constitutional questions
never imagined before Watson and Crick discovered the double-
helix. These issues concern privacy and whether it can be pro-
tected in the age of The Human Genome Project. 2
The ability to collect and analyze DNA samples is a
breakthrough for medical science and law enforcement, but it
t J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 1999.
1 HENRY LE RoY FINCH, Wnr mEIN 142 (1995) (quoting LuDWIG
WrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, 178 (G.E.M. Anscombe & R. Rhees
eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Oxford: Blackwell 1953)).
2 The Human Genome Project (HGP), also known as the Human Genome Ini-
tiative, is a federally funded attempt to map the entire human genome in order to
identify and eradicate all genetically based disease. See generally George P. Smith &
Thaddeus L Bums, Genetic Determinism or Genetic Discrimination?, 11 CoNTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 29-32 (1994). The HGP had initial funding of 135 million
dollars. It is estimated that the project will cost three billion dollars and be completed
in 2005. See Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and the End of Insur-
ance, 7 U. FLA. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 205, 206 (1996) (citing Daniel Kelves, Out of
Eugenics: The Historical Politics of the Human Genome, in THE CODE OF CODES:
ScmNTInC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECr 3, 36 (Daniel L Kel-
yes & Leroy Hood eds., 1992) and Victor A. McKusic, The Human Genome Project:
Plans, Status, and Applications in Biology and Medicine, in GENE MAPPING: USING
LAW AND ETics As GumEs 18, 18 (George I Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992)).
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also presents a threat to the American notions of autonomy and
the right to privacy. In the past decade, state legislatures have
authorized the collection and analysis of DNA from certain
types of criminal offenders to "assist federal, state and local
criminal justice and law-enforcement agencies in the identifica-
tion . . . or prosecution of violent crimes, sex-related crimes,
and other crimes against the person," 3 and to deter recidivist
acts.4 The DNA is analyzed, in the form of a DNA fingerprint or
profile, digitized, and retained for later identification purposes
in a DNA databank.5 These databanks then serve primarily as an
informational tool for law enforcement personnel, allowing
them to match DNA evidence recovered from crime scenes with
the profiles stored in the databanks. State databases are nation-
ally linked through a federal system called the Combined DNA
Identification System (CODIS).6
The federal and state governments are not unaware of pri-
vacy concerns surrounding DNA databanks. The National Re-
search Council states:
Confidentiality and security of DNA-related information
are especially important and difficult issues, because we
are in the midst of two extraordinary technological
revolutions that show no signs of abating: in molecular
biology, which is yielding an explosion of information
about human genetics, and in computer technology,
which is moving toward national and international net-
works connecting growing information resources.7
Thus, most states have included privacy provisions in their stat-
utes authorizing the creation of DNA databanks and imposing
3 W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-2 (1998).
4 See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 13.10 (West 1995); see generally NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNcIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIrNCE 119 (1992) (providing statistical data on recidi-
vism rates of prisoners released in eleven states in 1983).
5 Although "databank" and "database' are often used interchangeably, data-
bank means a repository of actual DNA samples while database refers to a DNA
record system. See generally IDAHO CODE § 19-5502 (9)-(10) (1997). In this Note, I
will also use "databank" and "database" interchangeably to generically refer to stat-
utes authorizing the collection, storage, and testing of DNA samples, and otherwise
note the distinction where important.
6 See discussion infra Part IV.D (describing CODIS and some of its privacy
protection measures).
7 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 113-14.
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sanctions for proscribed acts concerning DNA samples and
DNA information. The question then is whether or not DNA
database statutes adequately address privacy concerns.
The purpose of this Note is to study the measures state leg-
islatures have adopted to address privacy concerns and deter-
mine if their DNA database statutes are sufficient to protect pri-
vacy. Part II briefly describes the science underlying DNA and
DNA profiling. Part H provides a history of the challenges to
non-consensual DNA collection and the use of DNA evidence.
Finally, Part IV presents a critical analysis of current DNA da-
tabank statutes, argues that legislatures have neglected privacy
by failing to address the fate of DNA samples.
H. THE SCIENCE OF DNA ANALYSIS
The science surrounding molecular genetics is difficult, if
not impossible, for the uninitiated to understand. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the issues of DNA collection, storage,
and use in many aspects of our society leave us unsure of
whether our privacy has been breached or is in jeopardy. A ba-
sic understanding of DNA science provides some foundation for
a constitutional analysis.
A. DNA
There are approximately 100 trillion cells in the human
body.8 Each cell processes its own amino acids, simple carbo-
hydrates, lipids, and trace elements into proteins, complex lip-
ids, carbohydrates, and nucleic acid.9 Chromosomes, which are
structures of DNA and protein-carrying hereditary material, are
contained in these cells. Each nucleated cell contains twenty-
two pairs of autosomes, or non-sex chromosomes, and two sex
chromosomes: XX for females, XY for males. At inception, half
of the twenty-three chromosomal pairs are supplied by the
mother and half by the father. Chromosomes contain a double-
helix structure called DNA. DNA consists of a chain of nucleic
acids or nucleotides in various sequences. The types of DNA
nucleotides are adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and
thymine (T). The nucleotides of each strand bond with their
counterpart to form the double helix: C-to-G, A-to-T. A se-
8 See ANDRE A. MoENssENs Er AL., ScmNTmc EVIDENcE IN CIvqL AND
CRIMINAL CASES 879-80 (4th ed. 1995).
9 See id. at 880.
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quence of three nucleotides, called a codon, forms an amino
acid. The genetic code is read by identifying amino acids. A
gene, therefore, is a series of codons read in a series from a
fixed starting point.'0 Genes, which transmit inherited traits, are
specific sequences of nucleotides at certain chromosomal loca-
tions called loci. Some genes may consist of several thousand
base-pairs of nucleotides. Others may consist of more that one
million.
The DNA molecule is found in all cells which have a nu-
cleus, such as sperm cells, white blood cells, bone marrow cells,
cells found in saliva, and cells surrounding hair roots." The en-
tire genetic code, or genome, of an individual is contained in
each cell nucleus and is identical in each cell. Each strand of the
DNA double-helix consists of alternating phosphate and sugar
(deoxyribose) groups. Because the individual nucleotides bond
to the deoxyribose groups in random order, there is "tremen-
dous potential for variation[s]. ' ' 2
These variations give each human, except for identical
twins, unique DNA. For this reason, DNA is a helpful tool for
law enforcement officials. Collectable samples of DNA are
contained in bodily fluids such as blood, semen, and saliva. 13
DNA can also be extracted from sweat, nasal secretions, and
teeth.1 4 Over ninety-nine percent of the approximately three bil-
lion base pairs are the same among humans, leaving about three
million base pairs which vary.15 DNA typing thus focuses on the
segments of DNA that are highly variable, called "polymor-
phic" sites or loci. DNA typing allows scientists to find differ-
ences, deletions, and insertions as small as one nucleotide.' 6
10 See BENJAMIN LEwIN, GENES IV 68 (1990) (discussing the basic structure of
DNA).
1' See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 8, at 881.
12 Id. at 884.
13 See Yale H. Yee, Note, Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution for Law En-
forcement or Threat to Individual Privacy?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 461,464 (1995) (cit-
ing Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprinting: Science, Law, and the Ultimate Identifier, in
THE CODE OF CODES 191, 192 (Leroy Hood & Daniel J. Kevles eds., 1992)).
14 2 PAUL C. GLANNELI & EDWARD L IMWNKLERIED, SCIENIFIC EVIDENCE 2
n.1.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (citations omitted) (noting the different means of obtaining
DNA).
15 2 PAuL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKLERIED, ScIENTFc EVIDENcE §
18-2, at 2 (2d ed. 1993).
16 See Yee, supra note 13.
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B. Determining a Match
Although DNA provides all the information pertaining to
an individual's physical traits, DNA "fingerprinting" does not
utilize this vast amount of information.17 Instead, by using
variations at specific loci, DNA samples can be compared
against one another to determine similarities or the lack thereof.
Thus, DNA fingerprinting involves a comparison of samples,
and subsequently, the probability of a match. A determination is
made by a human examiner, often with the help of a computer-
ized system, as to whether different samples originate from the
same source, different sources, or whether the test is inconclu-
sive. A number of genetic tests are available, including: multi
and single locus restriction fragment-length polymorphism-
based typing (RFLP) and polymerase chain reaction-based typ-
ing (PCR), including direct sequencing. PCR-based typing is
generally considered superior to RFLP-based typing because it
requires a smaller sample and can be accomplished in less time.
Despite the typing method used, critics have challenged the
statistics of determining a match. In terms of privacy, the ques-
tion of whether the accuracy of DNA typing alone call for a
wider test population is raised. As one author explains: "The
great number of possible alleles (or possible variants) at each
highly polymorphic site has greatly complicated the task of
collecting adequate data necessary to calculate the probability
that any allele would occur in a wide population." 18 Others
contend that current theoretical models and procedures are suf-
ficient to compensate for errors, if any, resulting from sub-
population variations, and that the debate on this is essentially
resolved, 19a view which may cause once skeptical courts to
change their position on DNA admissibility.
20
17 See Dan L. Burke & Jennifer A. Hess, Genetic Privacy: Constitutional Con-
siderations in Forensic DNA Testing, 5 GEo. MASON U. Cm. RTS. L. J. 1, 4 (1994).
I Kenneth R. Kreiling, DNA Technology in Forensic Science, 33 JuRImEcs
J. 449, 455 (1993).
19 However, it is argued that even with the current sample population, statistical
estimates compensate for the scope of the testing population and do not lead to erro-
neous results. See Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute
Laid to Rest, 371 NATURE 735, 736-37 (1994) (claiming that conservative estimates
used to calculate match probabilities negate the effects population substructure has on
such estimates).
20 See MoENssENs Er Ai., supra note 8, § 15.17.
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I. CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE & COLLECTION
A. Admissibility of DNA Evidence
In the United States, DNA fingerprinting was first admitted
into evidence in 1988.21 As a fledgling science, DNA finger-
printing had to overcome state and federal standards regarding
its admissibility. DNA evidence has been admitted under both
the Frye v. United States22 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc.'3 tests. 4 As time passes, the admissibility of
DNA evidence under both Frye's "general acceptance test" and
the more liberal Daubert standard increases. First, although
Daubert is binding only in federal courts, it is influential in
state courts, especially those that have adopted the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 5 Many states have even taken legislative
steps to ensure the admissibility of DNA evidence and prob-
ability. 26 Now, as one commentator states, "DNA evidence is
admissible in every state and federal circuit--in one form or the
21 See Yee, supra note 13, at 465-66 (discussing Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d
841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), and United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio
1990)).
22 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923) (holding that in order for a scientific theory or
principle to be introduced into evidence, it must have gained general acceptance in its
field).
23 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence the trial judge must determine "that an expert's testimony both rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand").
24 See generally Brian Huseman, Note, Taylor v. State, Rule 706, and the DNA
Database: Future Directions in DNA Evidence, 22 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 397, 410-
18 (1997) (discussing Frye and Daubert, and their application to DNA evidence).
25 See Jennifer Sue Deck, Prelude to a Miss: A Cautionary Note Against Ex-
panding DNA Databanks in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 20 VT. L. REv. 1057,
1078 (1996) (citing William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Ge-
netic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War," 84 J. CaiM. L. &
CRIw OLOGy 22, 32 (1993)). "[D]NA profiling procedures are capable of being
tested and have been tested, although in a non-blind setting. [The process has been
subjected to peer review and publication, and both the Office of Technology Assess-
ment and the National Research Council have endorsed the general reliability of
RFLP profiling. [Finally], most courts have held that questions concerning the rate of
error go to the weight, instead of the admissibility, of the evidence." Id. at 1077-78
(citations omitted).
26 See MoENssENs ET AL., supra note 8, § 15.20 (noting that a number of states
have legislatively recognized the reliability of DNA typing through a number of
ways, such as eliminating the need for an expert witness to testify that DNA analysis
is trustworthy and dependable). See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-18-30 (1997) (requiring
expert DNA testimony to be admissible if it meets Daubert standards).
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other."27 The growing reliability and increased use of DNA in-
formation invariably increases the importance of issues sur-
rounding the collection and storage of DNA information.
B. Collection of DNA
DNA profiling is greatly facilitated by the ability to collect
and store profiles and samples for future retrieval. Because of
this, state legislatures have authorized the creation of DNA da-
tabanks. DNA databases provide a repository of genetic records,
which law enforcement officials can use for criminal identifica-
tion purposes.2 These samples are generally gathered from in-
vasive bodily extractions, most commonly blood samples. The
Supreme Court recognizes that such non-consensual blood ex-
tractions implicate the Fourth Amendment.
29
Many citizens argue that the collection of genetic material
in this manner violates our basic notions of privacy and thus,
the constitutionality of statutes authorizing the collection of
DNA samples have been challenged. A variety of legal attacks
have been mounted under the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from "unreasonable searches and seizures," the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' "due process" clauses, the Article I
"ex post facto" law prohibition, and the Eighth Amendment's
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause. 30 However, courts have
held that statutes authorizing non-consensual DNA extraction
do not violate the Constitution on a number of grounds.
27 Paul C. Giannelli, The DNA Story: An Alternative View, 88 CRIM. L. &
CRaNOLOGY 380, 380-81 (1997) (reviewing Harlan Levy's book, AND THE BLOOD
CRmD OUT).
28 See Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Pro-
tection in DNA Databanks, 30 SuFrOLKU. L. Ray. 185 (1996).
29 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (stating that non-
consensual blood sample extraction "plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of
a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment"); see also Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (stating that physical intru-
sion, penetrating the skin, infringes on reasonable privacy expectations).
30 See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (challenging an Oregon
statute on unreasonable search and seizure, and due process grounds); Vanderlinden
v. Kansas, 874 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Kan. 1995) (challenging a Kansas statute on unrea-
sonable search and seizure, due process, ex post facto, and equal protection grounds);
State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993) (arguing that a Washington statute vio-
lates the prohibition on unreasonable searches and the grant of equal protection, and
is unconstitutionally vague).
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First, the procedure is generally deemed "minimally intru-
sive.'' Courts have held that DNA collection, like fingerprint-
ing, constitutes a routine booking procedure.32 Thus, once a per-
son is in the lawful custody of the state, DNA collection is an
identification procedure and constitutionally distinct from the
collection of blood from "free persons. ' 33 Courts have found
this to be related to the legitimate state interest in ascertaining
the identity of suspects. "[T]he identification of suspects is
relevant not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is
arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve
other past and future crimes. 34
Second, prisoners have diminished rights of privacy. 35 The
Fourth Circuit in Jones v. Murray was first to apply this concept
to the statutorily mandated collection of DNA for data banking
purposes. It found, simply, that "[w]ith [a] person's loss of lib-
erty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, i3ghts
to privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment."
3
Similarly, the argument that such statutes violate the ex
post facto clause of the Constitution 37 has been dismissed. The
Ninth Circuit has stated that "[a] law implicates the Ex Post
Facto Clause only if it criminalizes conduct that was not a crime
when it was committed, increases the punishment for a crime
beyond what it was at the time the act was committed, or de-
prives a person of a defense available at the time the act was
committed. 38 Thus, laws requiring felons to submit blood sam-
ples for DNA databanks do not raise ex post facto concerns,
even if such statutes were passed after a prisoner has been in-
carcerated.39 In accordance, prisons may adopt reasonable
31 See People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); see also
Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559.
32 See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d at 1560.
33 id.
34 Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding Virginia stat-
ute requiring convicted felons to provide blood samples for DNA analysis).
35 See id. (explaining that persons lawfully arrested on probable cause and de-
tained by the state do not have the same protections as free persons).
36 Id.
37 U.S. CONST. Art I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating that "n]o State shall...pass any...ex post
facto Law. ..").
3' Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562 (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42-43
(1990)).
39 See Jones, 962 F.2d at 309 (finding that a requirement of a DNA sample is
not punitive in nature and that its sole purpose is to help establish a databank that will
aid future law enforcement).
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DNA DATABASE STATUTES & PRIVACY
regulations to enforce compliance with DNA databank statutes
even if they allow punishment for non-compiance. 
4 0
Finally, courts have dismissed the argument that forceful
submission to DNA collection procedures violates a prisoner's
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In Kruger v.
Ericson,41 the court found that "[a]lthough there is no static
'test"' to determine cruel and unusual punishment, the applica-
tion of the Eighth Amendment must come from society's ma-
turing "standards of decency."42 Finding that the drawing of
blood was conducted by a trained technician, in accordance with
medically acceptable procedures, the court concluded that "[t]he
use of a needle is hardly the cruel and unusual punishment con-
templated by the Eighth Amendment."43
Although DNA collection and use is widely accepted, fur-
ther constitutional challenges are likely if DNA databases ex-
pand in scope to encompass larger populations. Because of-
fenses covered under databanking laws varies among the states,
the boundries of DNA databanks remains unsettled.
IV. DNA DATABANK DANGERS
A. Scope of DNA Databanks
Currently, all fifty states have laws establishing forensic
DNA databases. 44 Many original databanking fears surrounded
40 See id. (concluding that prison regulations and their enforcement are contem-
plated at the original sentencing, and thus do not classify as additional punishment).
41 875 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995).
42 Id. at 587 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
43 Id. at 588 (quoting Boreland v. Vaughn, No. CIV.A.92-1072, 1993 WL 62707
(E.D.Pa. 1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 300 (3rd Cir. 1994)).
44 See ALA. CODE § 36-18-20 (Michie Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
44.41.035 (1998); ARz REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-281 (West 1989), § 13-4438 (West
Supp. 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-1105, -1106 (1999); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 295 (Deering Supp. 1999); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-2 01( 5)(g)(I) (1998);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g (West Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4713
(1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1995);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 706-603 (1993 & Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 19-5505 (1997 &
Supp. 1999); 730 ILi Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); IND.
CODE § 10-1-9-8 (West 1982); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 13.10 (West 1995); IOWA ADMIN.
CODE r. 61-8.1(13) (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (1995 & Supp. 1998); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.170 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15: 605,
606 (West Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1571 (West 1988 & Supp.
1998); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 art. 88B, § 12A (Michie Butterworth 1995 & Supp.
1997); MASS. GEN LAws ANN. ch. 22E, § 2 (West Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS
2000]
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the timing of DNA sample extraction. It was unclear whether
DNA database statutes would mandate collection from mere
suspects. Now, all DNA statues appear to be triggered only after
a conviction. Cases like Rise v. Oregon45 once previewed a fu-
ture in which DNA samples would be taken from virtually all
criminal suspects. But this has not been the trend of state legis-
latures. Now, all DNA database statutes appear to be triggered
only after conviction. While the timing of sample extraction is
settled, the scope of these laws is uncertain.
Many statutes authorize collection only from sex offenders.
Others encompass a larger population of criminals, sometimes
including crimes that are not likely to yield DNA evidence. For
example, Idaho mandates collection, not only for sexual abuse,
rape, and murder, but also for robbery, aggravated arson, and
even racketeering.46 North Carolina includes, among others, the
burning of a mobile home and the malicious throwing of corro-
sive acid or alkali in their list of crimes covered by the state
DNA databank law.47 The range of crimes covered under data-
base statutes has increased, and continues to do so, from the
original purpose of detecting and curbing sexually related
crimes.48
ANN. § 750.520m (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.3461,
299C.155 (West Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-15 (West 1999); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 650.050, .055 (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-102 (1999);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4104 (Supp. 1998); NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.0913 (1998); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:21 (LEXIS Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.21
(West Supp. 1999); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 995-c (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-266.4, .5 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-05 (1996); OHno REv. CODE ANN. §
2901.07 (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 588 (West Supp.
1999); id. tit. 74, § 150.27 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.085,
137.076 (1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7651.301 (West Supp. 1999); R.IL GEN.
LAWS § 12-1.5-4 (LEXIS Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-610 (West Supp.
1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5-14 (1998); TEmN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-113 (1997),
§ 40-35-321 (1997 & Supp. 1999); TEx. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 411.142 (West 1998);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-406 (LEXIS Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1933
(1997 & Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2 - 310.2 (Supp. 1999); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 43.43.752 (West 1998); W. VA. CODE § 15-2B4 (Michie 1995 & Supp.
1999); WLs. STAT. ANN. 8H 165.76-77, 973.047 (West 1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-
19-402 (1999).
45 59 F.3d 1556 (noting a state's interest in identifying suspects).
46 See IDAHO CODE § 19-5506 (1997).
47 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-226.4 (1997).
4 See Jean E. McEwen & Phillip R. Reilly, A Review of State Legislation on
DNA Forensic Data Banking, 54 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 941,944-45 (1994).
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B. Do Databanks Work?
The evidence suggests that database statutes are producing
intended results in homicide and sex-offender crimes. For ex-
ample, Virginia's database recently produced a "match," despite
the lack of a suspect,49 in the murder of Hope Denise Hall.50
Florida's DNA databank had produced eighty-seven matches by
1997,51 and 155 "cold hit" matches by November of 1998.
Other states have also had similar success with their data-
banks.53 The national database, CODIS, also appears to be an
effective weapon in fighting sex crimes. It produced matches
that led to arrests almost immediately after operation com-
menced.54 According to the F.B.I, the national databank has
produced more than 400 matches.55 Despite the current and an-
ticipated success of DNA databanks, protests concerning the
dangers of DNA databanking have not ceased.
C. Information Privacy
With these statutes, the legislatures have attempted to ad-
dress privacy concerns. Most DNA database statutes provide
penalties for wrongfully obtaining or disseminating protected
DNA information. 6 But, as some researchers argue, "many
states, in their rush to create databanks, have paid little attention
49 This is sometimes referred to as a "cold hit."
50 See Search of Database Leads to "Cold Hit" Arrest in 1994 Slaying, THE
VIRGINIA PILOT & THE LEDGER STAR, Jan. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6390445
(discussing an arrest made based on a DNA match of the arrestee's blood with semen
found at the crime scene).
5' See Jackie Hallifax, DNA Databases Open Cold Cases: Genetic Fingerprints
Give Law Enforcers Hot Weapon, DAILY REc. (Baltimore), Sept. 22, 1997, at 25A.
52 See Jeremy Manier & Steve Mills, DNA Policy Kept Suspect Free, Cn. TRm.,
Oct. 18, 1998, at 19.
53 See, e.g., Dan Morain, Genetic Sleuthing, L.A. TAMS, Feb. 20, 1997, at A3
(describing California's DNA criminal profile project); Kathy Walt, DNA Database
to Identifies Suspect, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 10, 1998, at 19A.
m See Jesse Garza, DNA Leads to Arrest in 3 Rapes: New Database Links Sus-
pects to Years-Old Attacks in UW-Parkside Area, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, Oct. 20,
1998, available in WL 14045802 (noting that the suspect was identified and arrested
two days after national F.B.I. database opened).
55 See FBI Launches National DNA Profile Index, AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct.
14, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
m But see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (failing to
address unlawful dissemination or use of DNA information); OR. REv. STAT. §
181.085 (1997) (limiting disclosure of DNA information and transfer of DNA sam-
ples, but not under threat of sanctions).
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to issues of quality control, quality assurance, and privacy."57
DNA databanking privacy issues can be divided into two major
categories: (1) confidentiality of DNA profiles and (2) the dis-
position of DNA samples. Most legislation addresses DNA pro-
files, but ultimately neglects to address adequately privacy is-
sues concerning the DNA samples.58 Ambiguities often remain
as to whether a state will store samples and, if so, for how long.
Sanctions for violations of DNA database statutes vary. For
example, the Oklahoma statute simply states that "[a]ny person
charged with the custody and dissemination of information from
the database shall not divulge or disclose any such information
except to federal, state, county or municipal law enforcement or
criminal justice agencies." 59 Conviction under this section con-
stitutes a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not
more than one year.6° In New Jersey, "[a]ny person who by
virtue of employment, or official position ... purposely dis-
closes" individually identifiable DNA information to unauthor-
ized sources is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.61 A viola-
tion in Massachusetts can bring a maximum $1000 fine or six-
month incarceration. 62 The South Carolina statute reads: "A per-
son who willfully discloses... DNA information contained in
the State DNA Database to . . . [those] not entitled to receive
this information is guilty of a misdemeanor .... , 63 It is also a
misdemeanor to obtain willfully such information. 64 The South
Carolina statute is typical of confidentiality provisions in that it
authorizes only the results of DNA profiling tests to be released
to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Thus,
there are widespread prohibitions restricting DNA information
dissemination, of both DNA profiles and DNA samples, at the
57 See McEwen & Reilly, supra note 48, at 957 (emphasis added).
58 See discussion infra Part IV.G.-I.
59 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.27a (West 1995 & Supp. 1999). The statute
also exempts DNA database information from any statute requiring disclosure of
information to the public and makes such information inadmissible in civil court
proceedings.
60 See id.
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.26 (West Supp. 1999).
62 See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E, § 12 (West Supp. 1999).
6 S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-650(B) (West Supp. 1999).
6 See id. § 23-3-650(C).
6' See id. § 23-3-650(A).
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state level. The restrictions placed on access to DNA informa-
tion is reinforced nationally by federal law.
66
D. The National System
Databases from the various states are linked to each other
through a system called the Combined DNA Identification Sys-
tem (CODIS). Congress granted the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) the power to establish an index of DNA profiles
under the DNA Identification Act of 1994 (the Act).67 CODIS
carries its own privacy protection standards and criminal penal-
ties. A fine of not more than $100,000 is levied for knowingly
disclosing or obtaining unauthorized individually identifiable
data.68 Additionally, access to CODIS is subject to cancellation
if certain measures designed to protect privacy are not recog-
nized by criminal justice agencies.69 The legislatures, in juris-
dictions wishing to use CODIS, are charged with developing
rules for their own databanks which adhere to those in the stat-
ute.70 States have adopted these parameters in their respective
statutes, but this, as I will discuss, does not ensure that our con-
stitutional notions of privacy will be protected.
E. The Future
It is not difficult to imagine that persons other than crimi-
nals will be required to submit DNA samples for other govern-
mental interests. Many statutes already provide that data ob-
tained from DNA analysis, albeit anonymous, be made available
to various officials for purposes other than law enforcement.71
66 See discussion infra Part IV.D (describing the DNA Identification Act and the
implications it has for the individual states).
67 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(a) (West 1995).
68 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14133(c) (West 1995).
69 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(c) (West 1995).
70 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b) (West 1995) (maintaining that federal, state, and
local criminal justice agencies be subject to rules which limit information disclosure
only: to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement purposes; in judicial proceed-
ings, if permitted; for criminal defense purposes; for population statistics databases, ff
identifiable information is removed; and for protocol, research, and quality control
purposes).
71 See, e.g., OIno REv. CODE ANN. § 109.573 (Baldwin Supp. 1999) (allowing
DNA database information to be used in determining the existence of parent-child
relationships); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.143 (West 1998) (allowing the DNA
database to be used for the identification of living or deceased missing persons and
human remains from a disaster).
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These statutes recognize the potential value of a more encom-
passing DNA databank. For instance, many states authorize
anonymous DNA information to be disseminated for, among
others, quality control purposes and population statistics data-
bases.72
The National Research Council has already asserted, with-
out disclosing identifying information, that "[a]ny population
databank used to support forensic DNA typing should be openly
available for reasonable scientific inspection .... According to
long-standing and wise scientific tradition, the data underlying
an important scientific conclusion must be freely available."
°
As the ability to collect, analyze, and use DNA information in-
creases, more calls for expanding the scope and uses of data-
banks may be inevitable. The advantages of DNA identification
and information systems are not limited to criminal justice pur-
poses. For instance, public health may one day be enhanced
through wide-spread screening for predisposition to a number of
diseases. Similarly, many states have already implemented
DNA databases to assist in the identification of human remains
from natural or mass disasters, or to identify unidentified per-
sons.
74
Some observers have argued that DNA databanks should
encompass a larger population than just criminals, to include the
entire general public.75 Still other commentators have advocated
other national uses for DNA, such as for identification in
health-care settings.76 The Department of Defense requires
blood samples from all military personnel for the purpose of
identifying remains, should the need arise. However, it appears
unlikely that such a national system will be accepted anytime
soon. The prevailing consensus, as noted by the National Re-
search Council," dictates against widespread use in the civilian
population. The Council cautions against moving in the direc-
tion of expanded databases because "Americans have generally
72 See id.
73 N.E. Norton, The Forensic DNA Endgame, 37 JuRxmncs J. 477, 493 (1997)
(quoting the National Research Council's first report on DNA evidence);.
74 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (1997).
75 See NATONAL RESEARCH CouNcL, supra note 4, at 121 (addressing the
opinion that, because many in the general public are already required to be finger-
printed for security and identification purposes, the same rationale could be used in
support of DNA profiles).
76 See infra note 80.
77 See NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNcIL, supra note 4, at 122.
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been reluctant to allow the creation of national identification
systems, and DNA profiling poses a special risk of invasion of
privacy (concerning personal and medical traits)." 78 But what
information do DNA databases and databanks put at risk?
F. What Information Can DNA and DNA Fingerprints Provide?
Many commentators have noted that a DNA fingerprint
contains little or no genetic information. 79 This is so because
RFLP analysis focuses on junk regions of DNA. These regions
"do not appear to contain either coding sequences or genetic
control sequences." 80 Thus, currently, a banding pattern can
only be used for identification purposes. The DNA fingerprint
itself yields no additional genetic information. In order for a
banding pattern to produce more information, DNA probes need
to be developed for those particular traits. Furthermore,
"whether these traits are determined by one gene, a combination
of genes, or some interaction between genes and the individ-
ual's environment is not known at this time."
81
Hugh Miller, H, cautions that our genetic information does
not constitute the "Holy Grail" of personal identity and thus de-
serves no more legal protection than other types of medical in-
formation. 82 This point is well-taken in a healthcare provider-
patient context. But where the government mandates collection
of DNA and retains control over the information contained
therein, the provisions for privacy protection must be scruti-
nized carefully. "It is important that the law realize it is simply
not a matter of what we can currently read from the DNA pro-
file analysis, but what we will be able to read from this genetic
78 Id.
79 See generally JoAnn M. Longobardi, Note, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need
for a National Data Base, 17 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 323 (1989).
so Lisa L. Dahm, Using DNA Profile as the Unique Patient Identifier in the
Community Health Information Network. Legal Implications, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & bNo. L. 227, 256 (1997) (arguing for the use of DNA fingerprints as
"patient" identifiers in the context of healthcare services) (quoting Dan L. Burk, DNA
Identification Testing: Assessing the Threat to Privacy, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 87, 94
(1992)).
81 Id. at 258 (quoting Amo G. Motulsky, Societal Problems of Forensic Use of
DNA Technology, DNA TECH. & FORENsIc Sci. 3, 5 (1989).
82 See Hugh Miller, II, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8
HEALTH MATRIX 179, 180-81 (1998) (arguing that "advances to genetic science can-
not warrant any transformation of the traditional idea of personal identity into essen-
tially genetic terms").
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information in the very near future."8 3 Although a person's
DNA may not be the "sacred vessel' 84 of an individual's per-
sonality, it does contain potentially sensitive information which
can have negative effects for the donor if not properly pro-
tected, now and in the future.
DNA databases which retain only test results and destroy
the sample would not pose a serious threat to privacy. The
FBI's computerized system for compiling DNA profiles from
the various states contains only the results of a test, not the ac-
tual sample.8 5 Thus, the federal government will not "retain
samples of blood, hair, semen, or other fluid from which the
DNA is extracted for testing."8 6 What the various states may do
with the DNA samples is another question.
In the rush to create DNA databases, many states have
failed to resolve thoroughly privacy issues.8 7 For states that
have provided sanctions for infractions that jeopardize a donor's
privacy, a question still remains as to whether the penalties im-
posed will be sufficient in the future in light of the inevitable
increase in value of DNA information. Since a DNA profile has
only limited potential to facilitate invasions of privacy, it ap-
pears that most legislatures have taken the necessary precau-
s3 E. Donald Shapiro & Michelle L Weinberg, DNA Databanking: The Dan-
gerous Erosion of Privacy, 38 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 455, 472 (1990).
" Miller, Mll, supra note 82, at 221 (arguing that "DNA information should no
more be conflated with the 'sacred vessel' of an individual's inviolate personality
than should ordinary medical information about his blood type or white cell count").
85 See Nicholas Wade, F.B.L Set To Open Its DNA Database For Fighting
Crime, N.Y. TMTS, Oct. 12,1998, at Al. Wade states that:
Under a new DNA profiling system known as S.T.Rs, for short tandem re-
peats, a person's DNA is tested at 13 specific sites at which a short length
of DNA is repeated.. .. The number of repeats is highly variable... [and]
gives a way of identifying each individual with a probability of one in sev-
eral billion .... All that goes into the computerized DNA databases is the
set of 13 numbers from the S.T.R. measurements. Only identifying infor-
mation, and nothing about a person's health or appearance, can be divined
from the S.T.Rs.
Id.
86 Manning A. Conners, Ill, Comment, DNA Databases: The Case for the Com-
bined DNA Index System, 29 WAKn FOREST L. REv. 889, 895 (1994) (citing Forensic
DNA Analysis: Joint Hearing on H.521-24 Before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, and the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 22
(1991)).
87 See generally McEwen & Reilly, supra note 48, at 956 (noting that only a few
states mandate criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use of DNA data).
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tions to protect this limited data. Most states have not failed to
address privacy concerns associated with DNA profiles and
even samples under their prohibition clauses. However, unique
privacy concerns surround the fate of actual DNA samples.
G. The Threat
The greatest threat to individual privacy comes from the
ambiguity in state statutes regarding the fate of DNA samples.
Many state legislatures have failed to codify clear rules gov-
erning the fate of the actual sample after it has been tested.88
For example, Florida law provides that the "Department of Law
Enforcement shall ... [r]eceive, process, and store blood sam-
ples and the data derived therefrom furnished pursuant to sub-
section (1)." 89 However, subsection (1) only specifies that two
specimens of blood be submitted by persons convicted of enu-
merated offenses to designated testing facilities. 90 Typically,
DNA database laws simply prescribe DNA profile results to be
maintained in a database, without mention of the actual DNA
samples.91 The disposition of DNA samples is left to designated
state agencies, often with little or no guidance. 92 Even CODIS,
the FBI system linking state databases, provides no direction as
to the fate of DNA samples.93 In fact, federal law, through CO-
DIS, contemplates that states will store DNA samples, but does
not provide direction concerning the duration of time that sam-
ple retention would be acceptable. 94
" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 1997) (discussing only what will
be done with the results of the analysis and not the fate of the sample itself).
39 Id. § 943.325(7).
90 See id. § 943.325(1).
91 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1995) (providing that "[t]he identifica-
tion characteristics of the profile resulting from the DNA analysis shall be stored and
maintained by the bureau in a DNA data bank"); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 706-603
(1993 & Supp. 1999); IowA CODE ANN. § 13.10 (West 1995); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 22E (West Supp. 1999).
92 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-640 (West Supp. 1999) (leaving the dispo-
sition of all DNA samples at the discretion of the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.41.035(h) (1998) (designating that "[t]he De-
partment of Public Safety shall adopt reasonable procedures (1) for the collection,
analysis, storage, expungement, and use of the DNA registration system").
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b) (West 1995) (stating that "[t]he index shall in-
clude only information on DNA identification records and DNA analyses that are...
(3) maintained by Federal, State, and local criminal justice agencies pursuant to the
rules that allow disclosure of stored DNA samples.. .") (emphasis added).
94 See id.
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Still, other states explicitly,95 or implicitly,96 authorize the
indefinite storage of DNA samples of known and unknown do-
nors. The National Research Council's cryptic recommenda-
tions reflect the difficulties states face when writing DNA data-
bank laws. The Council writes:
In general, the committee discourages the retention of
DNA samples. However, there is a practical reason to
retain DNA samples for short periods. Because DNA
technology is changing so rapidly, we expect the pro-
files produced with today's methods to be incompatible
with tomorrow's methods. Accordingly, today's profiles
will need to be discarded and replaced with profiles
based on the successor methods. It would be extremely
expensive and inefficient to have to redraw blood sam-
ples for retyping. We are therefore persuaded that re-
tention of samples after typing should be permitted for
the short term--only during the startup phase of DNA
profile databanks. As databanks become established and
technology stabilizes somewhat, samples should be de-
stroyed promptly after typing.9
95 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15: 606 (West Supp. 1999) (establishing a
state DNA databank to "serve as the repository of DNA samples collected under this
Chapter"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1 - 20.21 (West Supp. 1999) (providing that "[t]he
DNA sample itself will be stored in the State DNA databank"); MD. CODE ANN. OF
1957 art. 88B, § 12A(f) (Michie Butterworth 1995 & Supp. 1997) (stating that "[tihe
DNA sample shall be stored and maintained by the Crime Laboratory in the statewide
DNA repository"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.155 (West Supp. 1999) (stating that
"It]he Bureau shall adopt uniform procedures and protocols to maintain, preserve,
and analyze human biological specimens for DNA") (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 74, § 150.27a(A) (West 1995 & Supp. 1999) (establishing an offender data-
base "for the purpose of collecting and storing blood samples," and analyzing and
typing of genetic markers) (emphasis added); OR. REv. STAT. § 181.085(a) (1997)
(authorizing the Department of State Police to store blood samples).
96 See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4713(i) (1997) ("A person whose DNA
profile has been included in the [Delaware) DNA databank... may petition ... for
expungement on the ground that the conviction... has been reversed or dismissed.
The [state] shall expunge all identifiable information pertaining to the person and
destroy all samples from the person upon receipt of a certified court order."); WYo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-402(b), -404(c) (1999) (referencing DNA samples which are
"collected and stored"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-07 (1996) (mandating the de-
struction of "all samples" from a person who has successfully petitioned the court for
expungement).
97 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCL, supra note 4, at 122 (emphasis added).
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States that have addressed, or will address, the issue face the
problem of defining the parameters of the startup phase of DNA
profile databanks. Without this knowledge or the ability to pre-
dict, state legislatures are faced with the problem of having to
destroy samples in order to quell threats to privacy, only to have
the profiling basis change. "[W]e doubt that existing RFLP-
based technology provides a wise long-term foundation for such
a databank. We expect current methods to be replaced soon with
techniques that are simpler, easier to automate, and less expen-
sive but incompatible with existing DNA profiles."98 In fact,
new and more simple techniques are now available in the form
of PCR-based profiles. However, there is little indication that
PCR technology will not be surpassed by a better system, as
was RFLP.
Of the few states that have adequately addressed privacy
concerns associated with DNA samples, only one state, Wiscon-
sin, explicitly mandates the destruction of a DNA sample after
DNA profiling results have been obtained.99 Virginia's DNA
database statute impliedly does not allow its state agencies to
retain DNA samples after profiling. 1' ° Furthermore, both Vir-
ginial °l and Wisconsin10 2 have prohibitions specifically dealing
with DNA samples. A few states, like Indiana, legislate that
samples may not be "stored for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation about human physical traits or predisposition for dis-
ease."103 The attempts to limit the purposes for which DNA can
be used is a step in the right direction but does not end the pri-
vacy debate. The question of whether such legislation will suf-
fice to protect privacy concerns, now and in the future, still re-
mains.
98 Id. at 129.
99 Wis. STAT. Am. §§ 165.77(2), (3), 973.047(1) (West 1998) (providing that
blood specimens should be destroyed following analysis and conclusion of all appli-
cable court proceedings).
'00 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2 - 310.2 (Supp. 1999) (providing requirements for
DNA analysis).
'o1 Id. § 19.2 - 310.6 (1995) (stating that "[e]xcept as authorized by law, any
person who, for purposes of having DNA analysis performed, obtains or attempts to
obtain any sample submitted to the Division of Forensic Science for analysis shall be
guilty of a Class 5 felony").
I Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.77(5) (West 1998) (stating that "[a]ny person who
intentionally disseminates a specimen received under this section... in a manner not
authorized ... may be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned for not more than 30
days or both").
103 IND. CODE§ 10-1-9-18 (West Supp. 1999).
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H. Lessons From the Past
A number of potential problems, from inadvertent disclo-
sure to fraud, arise when citizens are required to surrender per-
sonal information for safekeeping by the government. The in-
herent dangers in collecting DNA samples have been noted.
1 4
The legislative history of this country suggests that promises to
protect privacy are only temporary. For instance, Social Secu-
rity numbers were originally intended to be used for the limited
purposes contained in the Social Security Act. 05 Today, Social
Security numbers are a primary means of governmental and pri-
vate sector identification. In the private sector, Social Security
numbers are used for identification by financial and educational
institutions as well as for blood donations and medical records.
Governmental sources use these numbers for, among other
things, tax and employment purposes, law enforcement, driving
records, child support, professional licensing, and student
loans.1°6 Government employees with access to these Social Se-
curity numbers have illegally accessed this information to sell
the numbers for financial gain. 107 Some have argued that entities
motivated by profit and self-interest, such as insurance compa-
nies and health maintenance organizations, will attempt to ob-
tain information stored in genetic profiles as a precondition of
coverage.10
8
One commentator argues that "penalties for misusing DNA
samples and information should be strictly enforced in order to
prevent and deter any potential for misuse that may remain." 1°9
The protection of privacy is undoubtedly aided through the en-
104 See Shapiro & Weinberg, supra note 83, at 473-84 (discussing the effects of
DNA databanking on privacy).
105 See id. at 477-78 (citations omitted).
106 See Flavio L. Komuves, We Se Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation
and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers,
16 J. MARSHALL J. CoMPuTER & Iwo. L. 529 (1998) (discussing the many uses of
Social Security numbers and the problems associated with such uses).
107 See id. at 534 (citations omitted).
10m See Shapiro & Weinberg, supra note 83, at 482. See generally Natalie Anne
Stepanuk, Genetic Privacy and Third Party Access to Information: New Jersey's
Pioneering Legislation as a Model for Federal Privacy Protection of Genetic Infor-
mation, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105 (1998) (arguing that as genetic data becomes more
available, insurance companies will base premiums on the degree of genetic flaws -
something that obviously calls for an increase in testing and widespread access).
109 Connors, supra note 86, at 908 (discussing the North Carolina DNA Database
Act of 1993, as it was the first tailored after suggested federal legislative guidelines).
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forcement of prohibition clauses in DNA database statutes.
However, it is the potential for misuse, fostered by legislative
uncertainty regarding DNA samples, which presents the greatest
threat.
L A Databank Proposal
The easily imagined expansion of the scope of DNA data-
banks and the ever increasing information which genetics yields
is a legitimate cause for concern when analyzing current DNA
databank statutes. Because DNA information contains unknown
potential to expose many aspects of human life, laws designed
to protect confidentiality must counterbalance this massive po-
tential. Inadequate laws, even if strictly enforced, will not stop
the encroachment on privacy. States should discourage indefi-
nite retention of DNA samples after DNA profiling by provid-
ing more guidance concerning the disposition of samples to the
appropriate agencies. To accommodate both the evolving DNA
technology and privacy concerns, states could set specific time
limits on the retention of DNA samples. After a designated
amount of time, based on a reasonable estimate of when the
"startup" phase110 will end, profiled samples should be de-
stroyed. This differs from the National Research Council's cur-
rent recommendation 1 in that it requires a logistical risk. The
suggestion to wait and destroy DNA samples only after typing
technology "stabilizes" is a concept too elusive to protect pri-
vacy concerns. A firm, but reasonable, time limit constitutes a
necessary measure to strike a balance between law enforcement
and the civil liberty concerns associated with governmental
storage of DNA samples.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, DNA databanks will continue to prove ex-
tremely effective to law enforcement ends. The most effective
databank would, obviously, contain as many samples as possi-
ble, and would retain the actual biological sample for future de-
velopments in DNA testing. This efficiency, however, would
come at a price that is, the retention of DNA samples by gov-
ernmental entities and the growing ability to decipher one's ge-
netic code. Although the federal and state governments have
110 See supra text accompanying note 97.
1 See id.
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mandated anonymity in non-criminal contexts such as statistical
health data sharing, the potential for abuse or even mistake con-
cerning DNA samples, coupled with the growing information
DNA yields, is a threat primarily because states have failed to
address the fate of DNA samples.
Although DNA might not provide the key to unlocking the
human personality, it does contain information that could be
damaging to donors because of the unknown potential as an in-
dicator for other aspects of human life, from behavior to dis-
ease. For this reason, provisions governing the fate of DNA
samples require the utmost effort to ensure that our notions of
privacy are protected. First, DNA use should be restricted to the
original criminal identification purpose. Second, unauthorized
distribution, acquisition, tampering, and use of DNA samples
and results should continue to be sufficiently sanctioned, and
thus discouraged 1 2 Finally, states should set mandatory dates
for DNA sample destruction.
What secrets future DNA analysis holds is unknown and
difficult to predict. What abuses may accompany the ware-
housing of such secrets is easier to foresee. All that can be done
in the "information age,"'1 13 where knowledge increasingly
equates to power, is demand that our legislatures recognize the
potential threats to fundamental American concepts of privacy
when ushering in new technologies. Accordingly, many states
need to reassess their DNA database laws and decide specifi-
cally the fate of DNA samples.
112 As DNA information may prove to be more and more valuable, states should
amend their sanctions for illegal dissemination to reflect this.
113 ALvIN TOFFLER, POWER SHIFr: KNOWLEDGE, WEALTH, AND VIOLENCE AT THE
EDGE OF THE 21sT CENTuRY 9 (1990) (describing how the economy has come to rely
on the transfer and use of information, rather than on manual labor).
140 [Vol. 10: 119
